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In How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims, Alex Voorhoeve suggests
accommodating intuitions about duties in rescue cases by combining aggregative and
non-aggregative elements into one theory. In this article, I discuss two problems
Voorhoeve’s theory faces as a result of requiring a cyclic pattern of choice, and argue
that his attempt to solve them does not succeed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Let rescue cases be cases in which an agent can either spare one person
a certain harm or spare each of many others a less severe harm, but
cannot do both, and in which the number of persons affected and the
badness of the harms at stake are the only morally relevant factors.
An ongoing debate in normative ethics concerns the question of how
to account for intuitions regarding moral duties in these cases. In
particular, it is difficult to find a rationale that accommodates two
intuitions: the intuition that in those cases in which the harms at stake
are similarly bad the agent ought to help the greatest possible number
of persons, and the intuition that in those cases in which the harms
at stake substantially differ in badness she ought to help the person
facing the individually worst harm. Consider the following cases:
Injuries An agent has the choice between sparing one person a very
painful injury or sparing a hundred others an injury that is
slightly less painful, but still very bad. The pain experienced
by each person would last for one week.
Tetanus An agent has the choice between sparing one person a
very painful condition, such as the worst spasms a tetanus
infection can cause, or sparing many others a hangnail.
Again, the painful condition and the hangnails would each
last for one week.
Many philosophers think that while in cases like Injuries the agent
ought to help the many, in cases like Tetanus she ought to help the
single person, no matter how many others she could spare the minor
harm instead.1
1 See, for example, David Brink, ‘The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms,
and Moral Theory’, Value, Welfare, and Morality, ed. R. G. Frey and Christopher W.
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Neither theories that allow for interpersonal aggregation nor
ones that forbid it can typically account for both these intuitions.
Aggregative theories rely on adding the harms experienced by different
persons and combining them into a single measure. So, they can
easily advocate helping the hundred injured by pointing out that
their combined suffering outweighs the suffering of the single person.
But they also seem committed to the implausible view that, if the
number of those suffering a hangnail is large enough, their combined
uneasiness will outweigh the suffering of the single tetanus patient.
Non-aggregative theories, by contrast, determine whom we should
help by considering only the severity of the harm each person faces
individually. Consequently, they can easily yield the intuitively right
result in cases like Tetanus: we ought to assist the tetanus patient
because she is suffering the most severe individual harm. But by the
same reasoning they also seem committed to implausible conclusions
in cases like Injuries.
In How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims, Alex Voorhoeve
suggests a natural solution to this problem that relies on combining
aggregative and non-aggregative elements into one theory.2 More
specifically, he proposes a modified aggregative theory, which is
constrained by non-aggregative considerations and thus avoids
implausible implications in cases like Tetanus. In this article, I argue
that while his account is supported by a compelling rationale, it
also faces two problems, and that his attempts to solve them do not
succeed.
The article is structured as follows. In section II, I introduce
Voorhoeve’s theory and the rationale supporting it. In section III, I
discuss two problems his theory faces as a result of requiring a cyclic
pattern of choice: First, the theory implausibly yields the result that we
cannot but act wrongly in some specific situations. Second, it classifies
as praiseworthy certain actions that seem pointless. In section IV, I
show that Voorhoeve’s attempt to solve these problems fails.
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Voorhoeve calls his theory Aggregate Relevant Claims (ARC). His
approach is phrased in terms of the claims people to be helped have
on the agent instead of the harms they face – a person’s claim roughly
being stronger the more severe the harm she faces and the worse-off
she is regardless of facing that harm.3 ARC defines a claim as ‘relevant’
iff it is strong enough compared to the strongest claim in that rescue
case, and it demands that the agent satisfies the greatest number
of strength-weighted relevant claims. The approach thus allows for
aggregation under the constraint that the course of action required does
not depart too far from satisfying the strongest individual claim, which
is what non-aggregative theories would demand. It is straightforward
that this approach yields the desired results in the cases just presented.
In Injuries, the claims of the many are almost as strong as the strongest
claim and they together outweigh it, so the agent ought to help the
many. In Tetanus, the claims at stake considerably differ in strength,
so the agent ought to help the tetanus patient instead of satisfying the
‘irrelevant’ claims of the many.4
The rationale Voorhoeve develops in favour of ARC is this: it is
permissible for each person to be substantially more concerned about
her own well-being than about the well-being of strangers. Although it
would, for example, not be permissible to spare oneself a very small
harm at the cost of not sparing a stranger a terrible harm, it is
permissible to spare oneself a certain harm at the cost of not sparing a
stranger a harm that is somewhat worse. Voorhoeve calls the idealized
point of view that a person would take if she were as much self-
concerned as morality allows and as much other-concerned as morality
requires the ‘permissible personal perspective’ of that person. A claim
now is ‘relevant’ iff, from the permissible personal perspective of the
3 Voorhoeve’s examples and his statement of what defines the strength of a claim
slightly differ from mine. The persons in his examples are already burdened by certain
diseases that lower their well-being and the agent can increase their well-being by
helping them. Accordingly, Voorhoeve defines a person’s claim as being stronger ‘a) the
more her well-being would be increased by being aided; and b) the lower the level of well-
being from which this increase would take place’ (Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate
Competing Claims?’, p. 66). I adjusted the definition to fit my speaking of harms instead
of levels of well-being and to fit the situation in my examples in which the agent can
prevent harms instead of reacting to their having already occurred.
4 Similar strategies of combining aggregative and non-aggregative elements have
been discussed before. Derek Parfit considers one in his ‘Justifiability to Each Person’,
Ratio 16 (2003), pp. 368–90, at 378–85, but ultimately rejects it because of a problem
I will discuss in section III. Kamm endorses one in her Intricate Ethics, pp. 297–8, at
484–6. Voorhoeve, however, gives what I think is the most compelling rationale and the
best-worked-out overall account of such an approach. For a recent critique of Voorhoeve’s
theory, see John Halstead, ‘The Numbers Always Count’, Ethics 126 (2016), pp. 789–802.
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person holding it, it is at least as important as the strongest competing
claim – competing claims being claims that cannot be jointly satisfied.5
In some rescue cases, unanimity as to which claim should be
satisfied emerges among the permissible personal perspectives of
everyone affected. More specifically, such unanimity arises in cases
like Tetanus, in which the strongest claim competes with much weaker
– that is, irrelevant – claims. Since in these cases the strongest
claim is objectively so much stronger than the weaker claims, it will
be seen as having priority not only from the permissible personal
perspective of the person holding the strongest claim, but also from
the permissible personal perspectives of those holding the weaker
claims. Cases in which the strongest claim competes with relevant
claims – that is, cases like Injuries – are different. Here, since the
objective differences between the claims are small, from the permissible
personal perspectives of those holding the weaker claims, their own
claims take priority. So, no unanimity emerges. According to ARC, if
such unanimity arises, it ought to be respected and the agent ought
to satisfy the strongest claim. If no such unanimity arises, aggregative
considerations should be decisive in determining what to do.6
The most compelling feature of this rationale, I think, is that it
roughly follows an idea that seems very natural in dealing with rescue
cases:
[In cases like Tetanus it] would be wrong to allow the claim of the one to be
saved from death [or, in our case, the tetanus spasm] to be outcompeted by any
number of claims to be rid of the very minor harm, because given the difference
in what is at stake for each person, someone facing the very minor harm should
withdraw her claim if she is aware of the situation.7
This thought is very much to the point. It just seems plausible to
think that if the difference between the claims is so significant that
not even someone holding the weaker claim herself would be justified
in satisfying her own claim, a neutral agent would not be either.
III. TWO PROBLEMS FOR VOORHOEVE’S THEORY
ARC can accommodate intuitions about rescue cases, but it also yields
two problematic implications which result from its requiring a cyclic
pattern of choice between options like the following:
5 Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?’, pp. 70–2.
6 This unanimity-based consideration is first introduced as one among many reasons
that speak in favour of ARC (see Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing
Claims?’, pp. 73–5). In later sections, however, it becomes clear that this is the
consideration ultimately supporting it (see Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate
Competing Claims?’, p. 77).
7 Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?’, p. 75.
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(a) Satisfy the claim one person, A, has.
(b) Satisfy the claims of a number of persons, B, that are less strong
than A’s claim but still relevant to it, and that would together
outweigh A’s claim.
(c) Satisfy the claims of a larger number of persons, C, that are less
strong than the claims of the B-persons, so that they are not
relevant to A’s claim, but that are still relevant to the claims of
the B-persons and would together outweigh them.
Between such options ARC requires the agent to make the following
choices: She should choose (b) from {(a), (b)} because the claims of the
B-persons are relevant in this situation and together they outweigh A’s
claim. She should choose (c) from {(b), (c)} because the claims of the
C-persons are relevant in this situation and together they outweigh
the claims of the B-persons. And she should choose (a) from {(a), (c)}
because the C-persons’ claims are irrelevant in this situation. So, she
ought to prefer (c) over (b), (b) over (a), and (a) over (c).
Drawing on John Broome,8 Voorhoeve nevertheless argues that ARC
does not violate the transitivity axiom of rational choice. The axioms
of rational choice only require that the choices a theory mandates be
rational given the values the theory sets. So, to find out whether ARC
violates such an axiom, the options in question must be individuated
by characteristics that are, according to ARC itself, the relevant
grounds for choice. That means including relevance and irrelevance
in the description. So, ARC mandates one to choose (relevant-b) from
{(relevant-a), (relevant-b)}, (relevant-c) from {(relevant-b), (relevant-
c)}, and (relevant-a) from {(relevant-a), (irrelevant-c)}. And this does
not violate transitivity.9 I grant this point to Voorhoeve. However, since
(relevant-c) and (irrelevant-c) both consist in helping the C-persons,
ARC still requires a cyclic pattern of choice. It still mandates that
helping the C-persons must take priority over helping the B-persons,
which must take priority over helping A, which must take priority over
helping the C-persons. In what follows I will show that this pattern
of choice, although not being irrational in light of ARC’s values, yields
two very implausible normative implications.
Voorhoeve is aware of the first of these implications. Call a case in
which an agent is presented with three options like (a), (b) and (c) at
the same time a ‘three-option-case’. As Derek Parfit notes, according to
theories like ARC, when presented with a three-option-case, the agent
8 John Broome, Weighing Goods (Oxford, 1991), ch. 5.
9 Alex Voorhoeve, ‘Vaulting Intuition: Temkin’s Critique of Transitivity’, Economics
and Philosophy 29 (2013), pp. 409–23, at 414–15.
Aggregate Relevant Claims in Rescue Cases? 233
cannot but act wrongly.10 For if (c) is to be chosen over (b), (b) is to be
chosen over (a), and (a) is to be chosen over (c), no matter what the
agent chooses, there will always be something she should have chosen
instead. This seems very implausible.
The second implausible implication flows from a modified version of
the classic money pump argument. The classic money pump argument
is employed within theories of rational decision-making to show that
agents should not have cyclic preferences because this makes them
exploitable.11 The idea is this: assume an agent has cyclic preferences
between holiday destinations such that she would be willing to pay
some money (1) for exchanging a seaside holiday for a city trip, (2) for
exchanging the city trip for a hiking tour, and (3) for exchanging the
hiking tour for a seaside holiday again. The problem is that, were
she to accept such a series of bargains – as she should, according
to her preferences – she would lose money and end up in the same
situation she was in at the beginning. Thus, having cyclic preferences,
the argument goes, makes her an easy victim for potential exploiters.
The classic money pump argument is controversial. Critics have
pointed out that it is not the cyclic preferences alone that make
an agent exploitable, but rather the combination of having cyclic
preferences and lacking foresight. Foresighted agents would, after all,
realize that they are being exploited and reject the bargains.12 This
criticism seems justified. However, I will argue that, when applied
to an ethical context, a modified money pump argument yields an
independent problem for ethical theories requiring cyclic patterns of
choice. And this independent problem is not threatened by the foresight
objection.
So, let us assume ARC were true and a moral agent, who had one of
the options (a), (b) or (c) discussed above available to her at the outset,
was repeatedly offered to swap, for a small fee, the available option
for the one that ARC ranks to be preferable. For example, imagine an
agent who had the possibility to do (a) at the outset was offered to
exchange the possibility to do (a) for the possibility to do (b), then (b)
for (c), and then (c) for (a), each exchange coming at a small cost. As
10 Parfit, ‘Justifiability to Each Person’, p. 384.
11 The argument was first sketched in Frank P. Ramsey, ‘Truth and Probability’, The
Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, ed. R. B. Braithwaite (London,
1931), pp. 156–98, at 182. Donald Davidson, J. C. C. McKinsey and Patrick Suppes
developed it further in their ‘Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I’, Philosophy of
Science 22 (1955), pp. 140–60, at 145–6.
12 The foresight-based objection was first raised in Frederic Schick, ‘Dutch Bookies
and Money Pumps’, The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), pp. 112–19. The view that an
agent having cyclic preferences can be pumped even if she is foresighted is defended in
Wlodek Rabinowicz, ‘Money Pump with Foresight’, Imperceptible Harms and Benefits,
ed. Michael J. Almeida (Dordrecht, 2000), pp. 123–54.
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in the non-moral scenario, the agent would have reason to accept each
independent bargain (ARC ranks the option offered to be preferable),
but by accepting the bargains she would lose money and end up with
the same option she had in the beginning. The problem, now, is that
advocates of ARC are committed to the view that by accepting these
bargains the agent does something morally good. If ARC were true,
the agent would be more praiseworthy the more bargains she accepts –
although more bargains just lead her to lose money without achieving
different results. This seems very implausible.13 And unlike the case of
the classic money pump, this problem cannot be solved by appealing to
foresight. Whether or not the agent foresees that accepting the bargains
will burden her unnecessarily does not matter – according to ARC she
would still be praiseworthy for accepting them.
So, as a result of requiring a cyclic pattern of choice, ARC faces two
objections: it implausibly yields that one cannot but act wrongly in
three-option cases and it classifies actions as praiseworthy that just
seem pointless.
IV. WHY VOORHOEVE’S SOLUTION DOES NOT WORK
Voorhoeve is aware of at least the first of these two objections – that is,
the one about the impossibility of not acting wrongly in three-option-
cases – and argues, in reply, that according to ARC the agent ought to
choose (b) when presented with (a), (b) and (c) simultaneously. If this
were true, it would not only counter the first objection, but also the
second one. For, it could then be argued that in the modified money
pump scenario, although only being presented with two options at a
time, the agent actually has the choice between all three of them. From
this and the duty to choose (b) in three-option-cases, it would result that
it is only praiseworthy for the agent to accept the bargains offered until
she secures the possibility to do (b). So, it would not be praiseworthy to
incur more and more vain losses. In what follows, however, I will argue
that the argument Voorhoeve gives for ARC’s yielding a duty to choose
(b) in three-option-cases is not sound and his theory is therefore still
confronted with both problems.
Obviously, the principle of satisfying the greatest number of those
strength-weighted claims that are not too much weaker than the
strongest claim does yield a duty to choose (b) in three-option cases, and
13 Voorhoeve does not say anything about how demanding his theory is. But if we
assume that morality requires agents to do the right thing even if this comes at some
(non-extreme) cost to themselves – an assumption that seems easy to justify – an even
stronger point can be made. ARC would then in certain situations require agents to bear
unnecessary costs.
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the Broome/Voorhoeve-strategy of redescribing options does so, too.14
The crucial question, however, is whether the rationale supporting
ARC also yields this result. Voorhoeve thinks it does. His reasoning
is this. When comparing A’s claim, which is the strongest in this rescue
case, to each of the competing claims, the following picture emerges: in
comparing A’s claim to the claims of the C-persons, unanimity arises
that A’s claim should take priority over each of the claims of the
C-persons. So, the claims of the C-persons can be set aside. In comparing
A’s claim to each of the claims of the B-persons, no unanimity emerges
as to which claim should take priority. So, in order to decide between A’s
claim and the claims of the B-persons, we should resort to aggregative
considerations. Since the claims of the C-persons have been set aside
and the claims of the B-persons together outweigh A’s claims, ARC
requires the agent to do (b).15
The problem with this argument is that the claims of the C-persons
are set aside although there is only unanimity that they have lower
priority than A’s claim, and not that they also have lower priority
than the claims of the B-persons. It is true that in both Tetanus and
Injuries it seemed plausible just to compare the strongest claim to each
of the competing claims and set aside the claims that were unanimously
judged to have lower priority. But in those cases, the strongest claim
was also the only claim that each of the weaker claims competed with.
So, it was obvious that the weaker claims could be set aside.
In three-option-cases, however, setting aside the claims of the
C-persons just because they are unanimously judged to have lower
priority than the strongest claim is not justified. Recall the compelling
rough rationale that Voorhoeve gives for ARC and that I cited in
section II of this article. The rough rationale says that if competing
claims considerably differ in strength we can expect from the person
holding the weaker claim that she withdraws her claim, if she is aware
of the situation. The idea, here, seems to be that the person holding the
weaker claim should understand that instead of helping her, the agent
should rather help the person holding the strongest claim. She should
withdraw her claim, in order that the person holding the strongest claim
be helped. But this reasoning does not apply to the C-persons in three-
option-cases. For, they have no reason to think that, if they withdraw
their claims, the agent will help person A (whose claim takes priority
over each of theirs). Rather, if the C-persons withdraw their claims, the
agent will help the B-persons, whose claims do not take priority over
14 The Broome/Voorhoeve-argument even yields that there is at least one best option
for any given feasible set of alternatives – the condition ‘feasible’ ruling out sets that, for
example, contain both (relevant-x) and (irrelevant-x).
15 Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?’, pp. 77–8.
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the C-persons’ claims. So, in three-option-cases it cannot be expected
from the C-persons that they withdraw their claims and consequently
it cannot be inferred that (b) is the required course of action. ARC
therefore remains vulnerable both to the objection that an agent cannot
but act wrongly in three-option-cases and to the praiseworthiness of the
vain losses objection.16
j.privitera@gmx.com
16 I thank Kirsten Meyer and Gabriel Wollner for their very helpful comments on
earlier versions of this article. I also benefited a lot from the comments of two anonymous
reviewers and from extensive discussions with Jonas Harney, Roland Hesse, Lukas
Tank, Stefanie Thiele, and with the participants of the Normative and Applied Ethics
Colloquium at Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin.
